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Agentic Control Plane

Logs

Every tool call a governed agent makes is recorded: the tool, the decision, the identity behind it, and — for delegated work — the chain it came down. This endpoint reads that trail, so you can reconcile spend, feed a SIEM, or reproduce a governance scorecard from code with no Firebase SDK.

GET https://api.agenticcontrolplane.com/<workspace>/admin/audit

Requires a key with the admin.audit.read scope (or *), or an owner/admin session. The workspace slug in the path must match your key.

Request

curl -s "$ACP/acme/admin/audit?since=2026-06-25T00:00:00Z&limit=200&tool=github.create_issue" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACP_KEY"
Query param Type Default Description
since ISO-8601 15 minutes ago Return only entries at or after this time. A bad timestamp returns 400.
limit number 200 Max entries to return. Clamped to 1–1000.
tool string — Optional exact tool-name filter.

Entries come back newest first, ordered by timestamp.

Response

{
  "entries": [
    {
      "id": "evt_9Qd2…",
      "tool": "github.create_issue",
      "decision": "deny",
      "decisionReason": "background tier denied by workspace policy",
      "agentName": "Campsite Scout",
      "agentTier": "background",
      "sub": "apikey:k_7f2a",
      "userEmail": "ops@acme.io",
      "sessionId": "run_Rk3p_Lm8_04",
      "requestId": "req_b81c…",
      "ts": "2026-06-25T17:22:09.044Z",
      "client": { "name": "Campsite Scout" }
    }
  ],
  "count": 1,
  "since": "2026-06-25T17:07:09.000Z",
  "limit": 200
}

Entry fields

Field Description
id Unique entry ID.
tool The tool that was called.
decision allow or deny — what the policy decided.
decisionReason Human-readable reason for the decision.
agentName The agent that made the call.
agentTier interactive · subagent · background · api — how it was running.
sub The identity that made the call (apikey:…, a user UID, or a delegated subject).
userEmail The human behind the call, when known.
sessionId Groups all calls in one run. Join on this to reconstruct a session.
requestId The individual request.
ts ISO-8601 timestamp.
client The connecting client app ({ "name": … }).

Delegation chain

For calls made by a delegated child key (key delegation), the entry also carries the chain — so a single row reconstructs the full cryptographic ancestry:

Field Description
originSub The root identity the chain descends from.
depth How many delegation hops deep this call is.
chain The profile chain.
runChain The run chain.
parentProfileId The immediate parent profile.

These are absent on non-delegated calls.

Paginating

There’s no cursor — page by time. Read a window, then set the next request’s since just past the oldest ts you received (or pull forward from the newest on a tail). For a continuous feed, poll with since = the last ts you saw.

import os, requests

ACP, slug = "https://api.agenticcontrolplane.com", "acme"
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {os.environ['ACP_KEY']}"}
since = "2026-06-25T00:00:00Z"

while True:
    r = requests.get(f"{ACP}/{slug}/admin/audit",
                     params={"since": since, "limit": 1000}, headers=headers)
    entries = r.json()["entries"]
    if not entries:
        break
    handle(entries)                      # newest-first
    since = entries[0]["ts"]             # advance past the newest seen

What you can’t do here (yet)

This endpoint returns raw governed events. It does not yet expose the aggregated views the console computes on top of them — per-run cost X-ray (loop vs leaf), per-agent run-to-run variability, or runtime decomposition. Those are on the roadmap as a /api/v1/runs resource; until then, the console is the place to see them, and this endpoint is the raw material to compute your own. See the API overview for where this is headed.

Next

Tune the policy → API overview →